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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION
The caption of this case contains the names of all
parties to the action.
JURISDICTION
The

Supreme

Court

has

jurisdiction

in

this matter

pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(3) (j) (1992 Replacement Volume) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

ISSUES.
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Are

"claims

made"

insurance

policies

(as

distinguished from "occurrence" type polices) invalid in Utah on
public policy grounds where such policies are used to provide
professional liability coverage?
2.
period

Even if a claim had been made during the policy

of the professional

liability policy

in question, is

coverage properly denied where timely notice of the claim was not
given to the insurance company under the circumstances of this
case?
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The Supreme Court should view the facts in a light most

favorable to the appellant.

No deference is given to the trial

court's conclusions of law; those conclusions are reviewed for
correctness.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634

(Utah 1989).

1

C
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE.
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
In an earlier case, plaintiff/appellant, AOK Lands, Inc.

("AOK"), obtained a $400,000 judgment against Utah Title and
Abstract Company ("Utah Title").

Utah Title had formerly been

insured under two successive one-year errors and omissions policies
issued by defendant/appellee Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance
Company

("Mutual

Fire"),

acting

through

its

agent,

defendant/appellee Shand, Morahan & Company ("Shand Morahan"). AOK
then commenced this action, claiming that it is entitled to recover
the policy limits from defendants in partial satisfaction of AOK's
judgment against Utah Title.
The trial court granted defendants/appellees7 motion for
summary judgment, finding that there is no issue as to any material
fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on both of the grounds set forth in defendants' motion: (1)
that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was not made until after
the "claims made" insurance policies issued by defendants had
expired and that said claim was therefore not covered under the
policies, and (2) that defendants were prejudiced by not having
been provided with timely notice of plaintiff's claim against Utah
Title as required by the policies and that said claim was, for that
reason also, not covered by the policies. All claims of plaintiff
2

as set forth in the complaint were therefore dismissed with
prejudice.
70.
B.

(Order and Judgment of the trial court, Record at 169-

Said Order and Judgment are attached hereto in the Addendum.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The following facts were set forth in the lower court in

the Memorandum
Judgment.

in Support of Defendants' Motion

for Summary

(Record at 28-32.) None of these facts was controverted

by plaintiff in its Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(Record at 86-88.)
1. Mutual Fire, acting through its agent, Shand Morahan,

issued two successive errors and omissions insurance policies to
Utah Title.

The first policy was for the one year period from

February 5, 1976 to February 5, 1977, and the second policy was for
the one year period of February 5, 1977 to February 5, 1978.
(Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. i, Record at
41-43.

Those two insurance policies are attached as Exhibits "A"

and "B" to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Documents.
policy) and 57-65 (second policy).

Record at 48-b6

(first

Those two policies are also

included as the last two documents in the Addendum which is
attached to the Brief of Appellant.)
2.

Each of the two insurance policies was a "claims

made" policy. Each policy states: "This policy applies to CLAIMS
FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD
from professional services performed

. . . ."

arising

(Emphasis in

original.) In the second policy (which is the one closest in time
3

to the occasion when plaintiff later made a claim against Utah
Title) that language appears toward the bottom of the third page of
that

policy.

(Record

at

59.)

That

page

is

a

one

page

"Endorsement" which is entitled "AMENDMENT - THE COVERAGE."

Even

though that one page endorsement modified several provisions of the
section entitled "The Coverage" in the main body of the policy,
that Endorsement did not make any change in the "CLAIMS MADE"
language quoted above.

That same language therefore appears also

in the main body of the policy, in paragraph 1 under the heading
"The Coverage." (Record at 62.)
3.
negligent

Plaintiff

act

in

alleges that Utah Title

December

1977

in

handling

a

committed
real

a

estate

transaction, causing damage to plaintiff, but plaintiff did not
discover Utah Title's negligence until June or July 1979 and did
not file a complaint against Utah Title until December 1979. Thus
plaintiff did not make a claim against Utah Title until some time
between June 1979 and December 1979.

(Paragraphs 4 and 5 of

Plaintiff's Complaint in this present action [Record at 1-2], and
Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 1.
67].)

[Record at

Plaintiff further admitted these facts in Plaintiff's

Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at

86-87.)
4.

Therefore, plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was

not made until

16 to 22 months after the February

5, 1978

expiration date of the second "claims made" policy.
5. In the one page Endorsement (referred to in paragraph
4

2 above) to the second policy, it is also stated that "it is a
condition precedent to coverage under this policy that all claims
be reported in compliance with the provisions of section CLAIMS 1 Notice of Claim or Suit."

(Record at 59.) And in that section in

the body of the policy under the heading "Claims" it is stated:
i.
Notice of claim or suit;
The Insured
shall, as a condition precedent to their right
to the protection afforded by this insurance,
give to the Company as soon as practicable,
notice
(a) of any claim made against them
. . . .

In the event claim is made or suit is brought
against the Insured, the Insured shall
IMMEDIATELY forward to the Company every
demand, notice, summons or other process
received by him or his representatives.
(Record at 63-64; emphasis in original.)
b. Even though plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was
made by December 1979, when plaintiff filed its complaint against
Utah Title, neither Utah Title nor plaintiff nor anyone else ever
gave notice to Mutual Fire (the insurer) nor to Shand Morahan
(which was Mutual Fire's agent in handling claims) until June 1988
when plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Echard, sent to defendant Shand
Morahan a letter dated June 3, 1988 in which he gave notice to
defendants (1) of Utah Title's 1977 negligence, (2) of plaintiff's
action against Utah Title commenced in 1979, and (3) of plaintiff's
1988 judgment against Utah Title, and demanded that defendants pay
the policy limits toward that judgment. That notice to defendants
was thus not given until eight years of litigation, including two
trials, had transpired between plaintiff and Utah Title, and
plaintiff had recovered a $400,000 judgment against Utah Title.
5

(Letter dated June 3, 1988 from Robert A. Echard to Shand Morahan
attached as an exhibit to plaintiff's Response to Defendants' First
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
[Record at 67, 76]; Affidavit of George M. Grulke [Record at 7782]); paragraph 5 on page 3 of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment [Record at 86, 88]. The Affidavit of
Mr. Grulke is attached hereto in the Addendum.
Because plaintiff, in its Response to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Record at 86-88) did not contest any of the
foregoing facts which were set forth in the Memorandum in Support
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

(Record at 28-32),

plaintiff is deemed to have admitted those facts pursuant to Rule
4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which
states:

"All material facts set forth in the movant's statement

and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement." Rule
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that a
party against whom a motion for summary judgment has been made,
must, in his response, "set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.

If he does not so respond, summary

judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."
C.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.
1.

An "occurrence" type of policy generally provides

coverage for a negligent act committed during the policy period, no
matter when the claim is brought.
6

In contrast, a "claims made"

policy covers claims made during the policy period, regardless of
when the negligent act was committed.

The policies involved in the

instant case were clearly claims made policies that covered "claims
first made against the insured during the policy period",

The

claim made by plaintiff against the insured, Utah Title, was not
made until 16 to 22 months after the policy had expired, and those
claims are therefore not covered by the policy.
2.

The validity of claims made policies has been upheld

by numerous coiirts.

The plaintiff has not cited a single case in

which a court has held invalid a typical claims made

insurance

policy (the type of policy involved in the instant c a s e ) .
3.

The claims made policy is

ie form of insurance

generally used to provide malpractice coverage to professionals.
In the professional malpractice area, negligent acts are often not
discovered ui iti 1 y ears later, and the I ise of "occurrence" po] Icies
therefore leads to a long tail of exposure for insurance companies
that makes it difficult to calculate risks and premiums.

The use

of claims made policies has stabilized the market in errors ai id
omissions coverage.

If claims made policies (limiting coverage to

claims made during the policy period) were held to be invalid (as
urged by plaintiff/appellant) there could be serious repercussions
in the insurance industry in this state and uncertainty as to the
continued availability of malpractice insurance for professionals.
4.

Utah cases cited by plaintiff

in wlurh statutes of

repose have been held unconstitutional based on the open courts
clause of the Utah Constitution (Article I, Section 1 1 ) , are not
7

applicable to claims made insurance policies•
5.

The insurance policies in question provided that as

a "condition precedent" to the insured's right to the protection of
the policy, the insured shall give notice to the company "as soon
as practicable" of any claim made against the insured, and in the
event suit is brought the insured shall "immediately forward to the
company" the summons and other suit documents received by the
insured.

In this case the insured (Utah Title) never gave notice

to the company of plaintiff's claim against Utah Title.

The only

notice the company (the defendants herein) ever received was from
plaintiff's attorney, and that notice was not given until more than
eight years after the plaintiff's claim was made against the
insured and not until after the plaintiff had recovered judgment
against the insured
trials).

(after eight years of litigation and two

Under the Utah case of Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987), there was no coverage under
the policy because of failure to comply with the notice provision
and the obvious prejudice to the insured resulting from such
failure.
ARGUMENT
I.

BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY, THERE IS NO COVERAGE
OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST UTAH TITLE.
Nothing would seem to be more clear than the conclusion

that if a policy states that it only covers claims made during the
policy period, then claims made after the policy period are not
covered.

Because it is so obvious, one would not expect to find
8

much litigation on the subject.

Nevertheless, there are some cases

where former insureds have devised a variety of arguments in an
attempt to extend coverage beyond the time clearly established
the policy.

An

example

is Stine v.

Cas. Co. .

Continental

349

N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1984), where plaintiff Stine, an architect, had
been insured under two successive one year errors and
policies.

omissions

Those policies covered his negligent acts "provided that

claim therefor is first made against the insured during this policy
period

reported i i writing to the Company during this policy

period

within

period."

60

days

after

the

expiration

of

this

policy

(349 N.W.2d at 129; emphasis in original.)
Over two years after the termination date of the second

policy, Stine was sued for negligent acts that may have occurred
during

the

promptly

period

gave

that

notice

his

insurance

t: :::: the

insurance

requested that the company defend him.
so because

the

was

in

force,

company

of

and

the

Stine

s "i i i t

a i id

The company refused to do

claim was not made during

the policy

required by the "claims made" provision of the policy.

period

as

Stine then

filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to compel the company
to defend him.
Stine

argued

that

even

though

he

had

not

g. i ven

the

company notice of the claim against him within sixty days after the
expiration

of the policy period

failure

give

to

notice

was

as required

excused

by the policy,

Michigan

statute

his
that

provided that "failure to give any notice required to be given by
such policy within the time specified therein shall not invalidate

9

any claim made by the insured if it shall be shown not to have been
reasonably possible to give such notice within the prescribed time
and that notice was given as soon as was reasonably possible."
(349 N.W.2d at 129, footnote 1.)
The insurance company's response was that it was denying
coverage, not because of the timeliness of Stine's notice of the
claim against him, but because "by its terms, the policy provided
no

coverage

for

claims made

against

expiration of the policy period."

the

insured

after

the

(349 N.W.2d at 129.)

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion,
rendered

judgment

for

the

insurance

company.

The

court

distinguished between a "claims made" policy and an "occurrence"
policy as follows:
As a general proposition . . . a "discovery"
or "claims made" policy is one in which
indemnity is provided no matter when the
alleged . . . negligence occurred, provided
the misdeed complained of is discovered and
the claim for indemnity is made against the
insurer during the policy period.
An "occurrence" insurance policy, on the other
hand, generally is one in which indemnity is
provided no matter when the claim is brought
for the misdeed complained of, provided it
occurred during the policy period.

Or, as the United States Supreme Court put it:
"An 'occurrence7 policy protects the
policy holder from liability for any act
done while the policy is in effect,
whereas a 'claims made' policy protects
the holder only against claims made
during
the
life
of
the
policy."
(Citation omitted.)
10

(349 N.W.2d at 130-31; emphasis in original.) The court ruled that
in accordance with the plain language of the policy, it provided
coverage only for a claim made against the plaintiff Stine during
the policy period.

Because the claim was made after the policy

period, there was no coverage.

Accord, Safeco Title Ins. Co. v.

Gannon, 774 P.2d 30 (Wash. App. 1989).
Plaintiff herein argues that the six year statute of
limitations on written contracts (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2))
and/or the four year statute of limitations on negligence actions
(Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25) should apply to the claims made policy
in question.

Plaintiff then states:

"Consequently, a claim for

negligence or a claim on a written insurance policy could be
maintained within four years or six years.

The lawsuit of the

appellant against Utah Title and Abstract Company was filed within
two years from the date of the insurance policy and the negligent
act."

(Plaintiff/appellant's Brief at 8.)
However, plaintiff's lawsuit that was dismissed was not

his suit against Utah Title, but his suit against Shand Morahan and
Mutual Fire, and that latter suit was not commenced within four
years nor even within six years "from the date of the insurance
policy and the negligent act."
however.

Plaintiff's

All that is beside the point,

suit against

these defendants was not

dismissed because he filed his cause of action too late; it was
because, as a matter of law, he never had a cause of action under
the insurance contract.

Because the insurance policy provided no

coverage of plaintiff's claim against Utah Title, it doesn't matter
11

when plaintiff filed his suit; it still should be dismissed as a
matter of law.
The two insurance policies in the instant case were
"claims made" policies that clearly do not provide coverage for any
claim that was first made after the policy period.

Because

plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was not made until 16 to 22
months after the last policy expired, that claim is not covered by
either policy.

Therefore, defendants have no liability either to

the former insured, Utah Title, or to plaintiff, who is the
judgment creditor of Utah Title.
II.

"CLAIMS MADE" INSURANCE POLICIES (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
"OCCURRENCE" TYPE POLICIES) , AS USED TO PROVIDE
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE, SHOULD NOT BE HELD
INVALID IN UTAH ON PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS.
A.

Cases Dealing With Claims Made Policies.

As

discussed

below,

numerous

cases

in

numerous

jurisdictions have upheld the validity of claims made insurance
policies.

The only case cited by plaintiff that held that there

was coverage under a "claims made" liability policy where the claim
was not made until after the policy expired is Sparks v. St. Paul
Ins. Co. , 495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985) (discussed on pages 18-23 of
Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief).

But that case dealt with an unusual

type of claims made policy (which was a professional liability
policy issued to an attorney) that was much more restrictive than
the standard claims made policy because it excluded coverage for
any act of negligence occurring before the date that the insurance
company

issued its first policy to the attorney.
12

The court

observed that "unlike the standard Claims made' policy . . .St.
Paul's policy provided no retroactive coverage whatsoever during
its first year."

(Sparks, supra at 408.)

The policy thus

"combines the worst features of 'occurrence' and 'claims made'
policies and the best of neither."
That

Sparks

(Id. at 414.)

case has very

limited

application as

evidenced by the fact that the same court - the New Jersey Supreme
Court - on the same day it decided the Sparks case, also decided
the case of Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395
(N.J. 1985), in which the court upheld a more typical type of
claims made policy. The plaintiff, Zuckerman, was an attorney who
had been insured under a professional

liability policy whose

coverage was limited to "claims made against the insured and
actually communicated to the company during the policy period."
Id. at 396.

(That policy was therefore more restrictive in

coverage than the policy in the instant case, which does not
require that the claim be communicated to the company during the
policy period but only that it be communicated
practicable."

"as soon as

Of course the claim itself needs to have been made

against the insured during the policy period.)

Ten months after

the policy expired, Zuckerman notified the insurance company of a
claim that had been made against him, but the company denied
coverage.

Zuckerman brought

suit to compel

the company

to

indemnify him, but the court decided the case in favor of the
insurance company, holding that there were no considerations of
public policy that should prevent the "claims made" limitation in
13

the policy from being enforced literally, and that the carrier was
therefore relieved from liability when notification of a claim was
not given until after the policy expired.
The court noted that, unlike the Sparks case, the policy
in Zuckerman provided broad retroactive coverage - it covered
negligent acts committed even before commencement of the policy,
subject only to the standard exception (which the court described
as reasonable) of prior conduct which the insured knew, or could
have

reasonably

foreseen,

(Zuckerman. supra at 403.)

might

lead

to

a

claim

or

suit.

The court observed that "in the vast

majority of cases in which

'claims made' policies have been

challenged, their validity has been upheld by both federal and
state courts. Many courts have explicitly held that 'claims made'
policies do not offend public policy."

(Id. at 400; citations

omitted; emphasis added.)
The

plaintiff

in

Zuckerman

argued

(similar

to

the

arguments made by plaintiff in the instant case) that "on public
policy grounds the

[policy's] coverage limitations should not

strictly be enforced absent appreciable prejudice to respondent
because of the late notification."

(Id. at 404.)

The court

rejected that argument, pointing out that cases which excuse an
insured in giving late notice of a claim to the insurance company
deal with occurrence type policies, where the notice requirement
does "not define the coverage provided by the policy but rather was
included to aid the insurance carrier in investigating, settling,
and defending claims. . . . Accordingly, the requirement of notice
14

in an occurrence policy is subsidiary to the event that invokes
coverage, and the conditions relating to giving notice should be
liberally and practically construed,"

(Id, at 406-)

The court

then stated:
By contrast, the event that invokes coverage
under a "claims made" policy is transmittal of
notice of the claim to the insurance carrier.
In exchange for limiting coverage only to
claims made during the policy period, the
carrier provides the insured with retroactive
coverage for errors and omissions that took
place prior to the policy period. Thus, an
extension of the notice period in a "claims
made" policy constitutes an unbargained-for
expansion of coverage, gratis, resulting in
the insurance company's exposure to a risk
substantially broader than that expressly
insured against in the policy.
Obviously,
such an expansion in the coverage provided by
"claims made" policies would significantly
affect both the actuarial basis upon which
premiums
have
been
calculated
and,
consequently, the cost of "claims made"
insurance. So material a modification in the
terms of this form of insurance widely used to
provide professional liability coverage both
in this State and throughout the country would
be inequitable and unjustified.
(Id. at 406.)
The insurance policy in the instant case is similar to
the claims made policy in Zuckerman in that it provides coverage
not only for negligent acts committed during the policy period but
also provides retroactive coverage for acts committed before the
effective date of the policy (except such acts as the insured knew
might result in a claim - the same standard exception as approved
in Zuckerman).

Therefore, instead of the Sparks case, cited by

plaintiff, being authority against the defendants' position in the
instant case, it is clear that under the Sparks and Zuckerman
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cases, read together, the "claims made" policy in the instant case
would be upheld by the New Jersey court that decided those cases.
In other words, the policy issued to Utah Title would be held not
to cover claims made against Utah Title after the policy expired.
Plaintiff alleges that the negligent acts of Utah Title
occurred during the policy period, but plaintiff admits that no
claim was made against Utah Title until after the policy had
expired.

Cases in that category

(with respect to claims made

policies) are collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R. 4th 382 (1985), in
§16(a) and §16(b) (pages 457-67) of that Annotation. As seen from
the cases collected in §16(b), claims made policies were upheld in
cases decided in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan,

New

Jersey,

Ohio,

Rhode

Island

and

(in

the

1992

Supplement to 37 A.L.R. 4th) California, Massachusetts, Texas,
Washington and Wisconsin, and in federal cases construing the laws
of Alabama, California, Mississippi and Oregon.

In contrast, the

"claims made" limitation was held invalid only in cases decided in
California, Michigan, New Jersey and New York (collected in §16(a)
of that Annotation), but the unusual facts of those minority cases,
especially when viewed in light of other decisions in those same
jurisdictions, indicate that even those four jurisdictions would
uphold a typical claims made policy (the type of policy found in
the instant case):
1.

The three California cases cited in §16(a) of that

A.L.R. Annotation are all based on similar, ambiguous wording
present in the claims made policies involved in those cases and not
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present in the policy in the instant case.

The California policy

covered claims which "may be made" against the insured during the
policy period instead of the more typical language:

"This policy

applies to claims first made against the insured during the policy
period" as contained in the policy in the instant case.

Also,

later California cases have upheld claims made policies that did
not have that ambiguity in it.

(See Burns v. International Ins.

Co.. 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying California law); VTN
Consol. Inc. v. Northbrook Ins. Co.. 92 Cal. App. 3d 888, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (Ct. App. 1979).)
2. The Michigan intermediate appellate court decision in
Stine v. Continental Cas. Co., 315 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. App. 1982) ,
cited in §16(a) of the A.L.R. Annotation as representing a minority
position (upholding coverage even when a claim was not made until
after expiration of the policy period) was reversed on appeal to
the Michigan Supreme Court, and is, in fact, the same case
discussed on pages 9-11 hereof.
3. The New Jersey intermediate appellate court decision
in Jones v. Continental Cas. Co.. 303 A.2d 91 (N.J. Super.Ct.
1973), cited in §16(a) of that A.L.R. Annotation, dealt with a
claims made policy that was very restrictive in its retroactive
coverage; it insured prior negligent acts only if "insured by this
Company under [a] prior policy." Twelve years later the New Jersey
Supreme Court commented that Jones was "the only reported case in
which a 'claims made' policy was invalidated because of its lack of
retroactive coverage" and that "other state and federal courts
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confronted with 'claims made' policies providing limited or no
retroactive coverage have declined to follow Jones."

(Sparks v.

St. Paul Ins. Co. . 495 A.2d 406, 410-11 (N.J. 1985).) As discussed
above, the later case of Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. ,
495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985), makes it clear that New Jersey would
uphold the more typical form of claims made policy

(the type

involved in the instant case).
4.

Finally, the New York case cited in §16(a) of that

A.L.R. Annotation, Heen & Flint Assoc, v. Travelers Indemnity Co..
400 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup.Ct., Monroe Co., 1977), was a memorandum
decision by a single trial court judge, who held that coverage
existed

(though a claim was not made until after the policy

expired) based on the unusual facts of that case - that the insured
was not able to obtain continued coverage from his carrier (because
the

carrier

ceased

writing

professional

liability

insurance

policies in New York) and was not able to obtain a replacement
policy from any other carrier with respect to the negligent act in
question.
Thus, of all of the cases collected in Annot. 37 A.L.R.
4th 382 (1985) , there appears not to be a single case that supports
plaintiff's contention in the instant case that Utah Title should
be covered under the claims made policy even though plaintiff's
claim against Utah Title was not made until after the policy
expired.
On pages 10-14 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief, 16 cases
are cited.

It appears that all of those cases cited by plaintiff
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involved an "occurrence" type policy and not a "claims made"
policy. That conclusion appears certain for two reasons:

(1) the

insurance policies involved in those cases did not include any
professional

liability

policies

but

instead

involved

life

insurance, fire insurance, automobile insurance, public liability
insurance for personal injury and a fidelity bond issued to a
savings and loan company.

In those types of insurance, occurrence

policies are typically used.

(2) None of those cases dealt with

the issue of whether a claims made policy could be held to cover a
claim made after the policy expired; in fact, none of those cases
even referred to the policy involved as being a claims made policy.
Several of those cases cited by plaintiff held that an
insured and his insurer cannot agree between themselves that the
policy does not cover a particular claim, and thereby defeat
whatever rights an injured party may have to be compensated by
insurance proceeds.

That situation obviously is not involved in

the instant case.
Others of those cases cited by plaintiff dealt with the
issue of whether the insured7s late notice to the insurance company
of the claim would be excused, and some of those cases held that
such late notice would not be grounds for denial of coverage under
the policy unless the insurance company could show prejudice. But
that "notice - prejudice" rule is often not applicable to claims
made insurance policies for the following reasons:
1.

If the claim against the insured is not made during

the policy period, it is immaterial whether or not the insured gave
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timely notice of the claim to the insurance company.

The claim is

still not covered.
2.

Many claims made policies provide coverage only for

claims where both (1) the claim itself is made against the insured
during the policy period and (2) notice of the claim is also given
to the insurer during the policy period. In those case the "notice
- prejudice" rule has no application.

Late notice cannot be

excused because, as pointed out in Zuckerman v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co. . 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985)- (discussed on pages 13-16
above), the giving of notice to the insurance company is the actual
event that "invokes coverage," as distinguished from an occurrence
policy where the notice requirement does not define the coverage
but is merely to enable the insurance company to investigate,
defend and settle the claim).

(See Burns v. International Ins.

Co. , 929 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991), "the 'notice - prejudice'
rule does not apply to claims-made policies.")
Finally, even if the "notice - prejudice" rule were held
to apply in the instant case, the facts regarding the lack of
notice are so egregious that prejudice to the insurance company is
clearly enormous.
In summary, virtually unanimous case law has upheld the
validity of claims made insurance policies.
B.

Public Policy Considerations in Support of Claims
Made Policies.

The court in Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
495 A. 2d 395

(N.J. 1985)

(discussed

on pages 13-16

hereof),

reviewed the reasons for the development and increasing use of
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claims made policies.

"Occurrence" policies, which were once the

standard form of insurance, are now ordinarily used with respect to
events whose occurrence is usually easy to ascertain and where
claims are usually made within a reasonably short time after the
event (death, fire, collision, etc.).

But occurrence policies

present difficult underwriting problems with certain kinds of
injuries and the negligence that causes those injuries, which may
not

be

discovered

professional

until

malpractice,

years

after

environmental

they

occur,

hazards

and

such

as

defective

products. Under an occurrence policy those risks result in a "long
tail" of exposure to the carrier, long after the policy expires,
and over the years claims have increased in number and amount far
beyond what the underwriters could have originally estimated.
These problems have led, over the past several decades, to the
wide-spread use of "claims made" policies instead of "occurrence"
policies with respect to those kinds of risks.

(See Zuckerman,

supra at 398-401.
One commentator suggested that the use of "claims made"
policies

has

omissions

stabilized

coverage

and

the

insurance

that

companies

market

in

attempting

errors
to

and

write

"occurrence" type policies with respect to errors and omissions
insurance have not been able to remain in the marketplace.
Shand,

"Is

Your

Policy

on

a

(D.

'Claims Made' Basis?," Weekly

Underwriter. Sept. 15, 1973, at 8, quoted in Zuckerman, supra at
400.)
The Zuckerman case details some of the advantages, both
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to insureds and to insurance carriers, that claims made policies
have over occurrence policies:
The obvious advantage to the underwriter
issuing "claims made" policies is the ability
to calculate risks and premiums with greater
exactitude since the insurer's exposure ends
at a fixed point, usually the policy
termination date. . . . This may result in
lower rates for the insured. . . . A corollary
benefit to the insured is that since coverage
is purchased on a contemporary basis, it can
afford protection in current dollars for
liability that may be based on negligence that
occurred years earlier. . . .
Obviously, it is not against the public
interest that professional practitioners, for
example, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and
architects, be able to obtain insurance on a
reasonably structured "claims made" basis,
rather than being left in the position of
being able to obtain insurance only on an
"occurrence" basis at what may perhaps be
exorbitant rates that few could afford.
(Id. at 399-401.)
In the instant case, if plaintiff's contention were
accepted - that a claims made policy should cover claims made after
the policy expires, in spite of the specific policy language to the
contrary - it would mean that the typical claims made policy issued
in this state would be judicially converted into an occurrence
policy; in fact it would go further than that because claims made
policies (unlike occurrence policies) usually cover past acts of
negligence.

If claims made policies were then construed to cover

future claims also, such policies would be judicially converted
into a liability policy broader in coverage than either a claims
made or an occurrence policy.

Such a result would certainly cause

serious repercussions in the insurance industry in this state. It
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would be difficult for insurance companies to calculate risks and
premiums

with

any

degree

of

certainty;

premium

rates would

obviously have to be increased, and the future of claims made
policies would be uncertain. Even plaintiff/appellant acknowledges
that holding claims made policies to be invalid would "have a
significant
future."

impact

on professional

insurance coverage

in the

(Appellant's Docketing Statement, page 6.)
With respect to policies already issued - even those

which were issued and expired years ago, like the policy in the
instant

case - the

insurance companies

would

be

subject

to

dramatically increased exposure that they did not anticipate and
for which no premium was calculated, and the insureds under those
policies

(or their judgment

creditors) would

thus

receive a

windfall in protection for which the insured did not pay.
On page 21 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief he argues that
the claims made policy in the instant case does not have adequate
coverage of negligent acts occurring prior to the effective date of
the policy because it excludes coverage for claims, and for
negligent acts that might result in claims, that the insured knows
about at the time he applies for the insurance.

But that is a

standard provision in a claims made policy, and plaintiff points to
no case where a court has objected to that clause or held a claims
made policy to be invalid because of it.

(See e.g., Zuckerman v.

National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985), where that
"knowledge of prior negligence" clause is approved.)
If persons who render professional services and who
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become aware of claims which are about to be asserted against them,
have the right to run out and buy insurance that will pay to defend
them

and

to

indemnify

them

from

those

claims,

it would

be

tantamount to persons who find they are terminally ill then buying
a large amount of life insurance•

The insurance industry could go

broke quickly if it was forced to write that kind of business.
In summary, claims made policies fill an important need
to provide insurance for professional malpractice, and public
policy considerations would indicate that such policies should be
upheld and should continue to be available in the marketplace.
C.

Cases Dealing With Statutes of Repose and The Open
Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution Are
Inapplicable.

Plaintiff attempts to make up for its lack of any direct
case authority by the novel argument that a claims made insurance
policy is similar to a statute of repose and should be held
unconstitutional

under

Article

I,

Section

11

of

the

Utah

Constitution (the "open courts" clause) and under the case of Berry
ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985),
and other Utah cases which have applied the open courts clause.
The Berry case held a statute of repose under the Utah Products
Liability Act to be unconstitutional under the Utah open courts
clause.
P. 2d

Plaintiff also cites Horton v. Goldminer/s Daughter. 785

1087

(Utah

1989),

which

held

a statute

of

repose

for

architects and builders to be unconstitutional under the Utah open
courts clause, and Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348
(Utah 1989), which held that a statute limiting damages, as applied
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for the benefit of University Hospital, was unconstitutional under
the open courts clause.
The statute of repose cases dealt with the issue of
whether a cause of action could constitutionally be barred by a
statute that bars an action after a specified time where that time
begins to run from some event other than the injury that gives rise
to the cause of action.

For example, the statute of repose dealt

with in the Berrv case purported to bar an action, regardless of
when the injury from a defective product occurred, if the action
was not brought within six years of the initial purchase of the
product and within 10 years of the date of its manufacture.
In contrast to a statute of repose issue (whether a party
who has a cause of action may be barred from commencing a suit to
pursue his cause of action), plaintiff in the instant case never
had a cause of action against the defendants for the simple reason
that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title was not made within the
policy period and was not, therefore, covered by the policy.
These statute of repose cases and the open courts clause
therefore have no applicability to the instant case.

III. THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNDER THE POLICY BECAUSE NOTICE OF
THE CLAIM WAS NOT GIVEN TO THE INSURED AS REQUIRED BY THE
POLICY.
As a separate and independent ground, summary judgment
was granted to defendants because they were prejudiced by not
having been provided with timely notice of plaintiff's claim
against Utah Title as required by the policy.
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(Order and Judgment

of the trial court, Record at 169-170.)
That judgment should be affirmed based on the holding in
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah
1987) .

That case is squarely in point with the facts of the

instant case, even including the context in which the case came to
the Supreme Court (an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of
the defendant insurance company).
In Busch, State Farm issued a liability insurance policy
in 1980 to plaintiff, a land developer.

That same year plaintiff

was sued for damages it had caused in 1978 to land adjacent to one
of its developments.

The case was tried to a jury, and in 1982 a

$29,000 judgment was entered against plaintiff. In 1983 plaintiff,
for the first time, notified State Farm of the claim and demanded
indemnity under the policy.

Thus notice to State Farm was not

given until five years after the negligent act occurred, three
years after the lawsuit had been filed against plaintiff, and not
until after the suit had been tried and a judgment rendered. State
Farm declined coverage under its policy because plaintiff had not
complied with the notice requirement of the policy, which stated:
In the event of an occurrence, written
notice . . . shall be given by or for the
Insured to the Company . . .
as soon as
practicable.
If claim is made or suit is brought against
the Insured, the Insured shall immediately
forward to the Company every demand, notice,
summons or other process received by him or
his representative.
(743 P.2d at 1218.)

(That language is virtually identical to the

policy language in the instant case, quoted in paragraph 5 under
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the "Statement of Facts" section above.)
The trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary
judgment, and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that,
"Clearly, under the facts of this case, written notice was not
given to defendants as soon as practicable" as required by the
policy.

(743 P.2d at 1218.)

Plaintiff in that case argued that

despite its failure to comply with the notice provisions of the
policy,

the case should

not have been dismissed

unless the

insurance company showed that actual prejudice resulted from the
lack of notice.

The court's response was that, regardless of

whether actual prejudice need be shown (an issue the court chose
not to decide) , such prejudice was amply shown in the facts,
established by the affidavit of State Farm's claims manager, that
because of the late notice the insurance company had not had the
opportunity to investigate and possibly settle the claim or to
employ its own counsel to defend the lawsuit.
The facts of the instant case are even more onerous and
prejudicial to the defendant insurance company than in the Busch
case.

Here the insurance company never did receive notice of the

claim from its insured

(most likely because the insured, Utah

Title, knew that the two policies had expired before plaintiff made
a claim against Utah Title).

The notice the insurance company

eventually got was from the insured's judgment creditor, the
plaintiff in this action, but that notice was not given until (1)
more than 10 years after the negligent act giving rise to the
claim, (2) over eight years after the claim was made, (3) after
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eight years of litigation had ensued, and (4) five months after
judgment had been entered against the insured.

And as stated by

George Grulke, the claims manager for Shand Morahan,
affidavit

in his

filed in support of defendants' motion for summary

judgment:
Because of the absence of any notice to
Shand Morahan until June 1988, Mutual Fire and
Shand Morahan were deprived of the opportunity
to do the kinds of things that we routinely do
in handling claims or to be involved in any
way in the claim of AOK Lands. We had no
opportunity to review the claim, to examine
the documents that Utah Title was alleged to
have been negligent in handling or drafting,
to interview and take statements of witnesses,
to review issues of insurance coverage of Utah
Title, to adjust and possibly settle the
claim, to retain an attorney to represent Utah
Title in the law suit filed by AOK Lands, or
to participate in any way in the defense of
that suit.
(Paragraph 8 of Mr. Grulke's Affidavit; Record at 77, 80.) A copy
of Mr. Grulke's Affidavit is attached in the Addendum hereto.
It is hard to imagine a more extreme case of noncompliance with the notice provision of the insurance agreement and
of prejudice to the insurance company, and the trial court in the
instant case accordingly found that the defendants were prejudiced
by not having been provided with timely notice of plaintiff's claim
against Utah Title.
at 169-70.)

(Order and Judgment of the trial court, Record

There was therefore no coverage under either policy

because the coverage was expressly conditioned upon claims being
promptly reported.
Plaintiff/appellant states that "the transcript of the
lower court's decision" attached to his Brief "demonstrates that
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Judge Stanton M. Taylor did not give any serious considerations to
the legal or factual issues raised in the lower court.

Plaintiff

also claims that the lower court "failed to give the appellant an
opportunity to discover whether or not the insurance company had
received constructive or actual knowledge of the claim which was
filed by the appellant against Utah Title."
Brief at 14.)

(Plaintiff/appellant's

Those statements are without support in the record

as indicated by the following:
1.

The hearing before the trial court continued for

probably 20 to 30 minutes or longer, yet plaintiff/appellant has
elected to obtain and file with its Brief a partial transcript of
only the last three or four minutes of that hearing.

That is not

adequate to indicate what the trial court did or did not consider.
2. At the time of the trial court hearing on August 19,
1991, on defendants' summary judgment motion, the court had before
it the extensive memorandums of defendants and of plaintiff in
support of and in opposition to, respectively, defendant's motion
for summary judgment. (Record at 28 [Memorandum in Support of
Defendants'

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment],

86

[Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Response], and 117 [Defendants' Reply Memorandum].)
3. The Order and Judgment of the trial court stated that
the court had considered the various memorandums and affidavits,
"the pleadings and record in this case and the arguments of
counsel" (Record at 169), and there is nothing in the record to
indicate that Judge Taylor did not duly consider those matters.
4.

Neither at the trial court nor in this appeal has
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plaintiff pointed to anything in the record that controverts any of
the facts set forth by defendants in their Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and set forth by defendants
in the Statement of Facts in this Brief.
5. Plaintiff also made no request at the hearing before
the trial court for more time to develop any further facts pursuant
to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

Even in Appellant's Brief before this court it has

specifically admitted facts sufficient to justify the rendering of
summary judgment against appellant, including the following:
a.

The last of the two claims made insurance

policies issued by defendants to Utah Title expired February 5,
1978.

(Appellant's Brief at 7.)
b.

"The insurance policy specifically informed the

insured, Utah Title. . . . that no claims made after the policy
period which concluded on February 5, 1978, were covered by the
insurance policy."
c.

(Appellant's Brief at 9.)
Plaintiff did not even learn of Utah Title's

negligence until the summer of 1979 (over 16 months after the
claims made policy expired) and did not file suit against Utah
Title until November or December 1979 (21 or 22 months after the
latter of the two claims made policies expired).

(Appellant's

Brief at 4, 9.)
d.

After extensive litigation and five weeks of a

bifurcated trial, plaintiff obtained judgment against Utah Title in
January 1988.

(Appellant's Brief at 2, 4.)
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e. Plaintiff notified defendants of the judgment in
June 1988.

(Appellant's Brief at 2, 6, 12.)

It is hard to imagine a case where there is so clearly no
dispute as to the material facts, and if it appeared to plaintiff
that Judge Taylor did not immerse himself in factual issues, it is
probably because plaintiff never raised any factual issues.
Plaintiff argues that the defendant insurance company is
not prejudiced by failure to receive notice of plaintiff's claim
against Utah Title and of the ongoing litigation between plaintiff
and Utah Title because the "trial of the action between Utah Title
and the appellant and the discovery conducted thereunder, should
provide sufficient information to the appellees in the form of
documentation, depositions, witnesses' testimony on record, etc."
(Plaintiff/appellant's Brief at 14-15.) In other words, plaintiff
is arguing that the insurance company is not prejudiced because
even now, at this late date, it can go back and

read the

depositions and the transcript of the two trials that were held and
find out all it wants to about what happened in the case!
fallacy of that argument is self evident.

The

Is plaintiff suggesting

that the defendant insurance company should now be able to go back
and litigate with plaintiff in the present action the issue of
whether Utah Title was negligent?
conceding that.

Certainly plaintiff is not

Plaintiff's argument would effectively eliminate

from insurance policies the provisions that insurance companies are
entitled to notice of claims made against their insureds.
On page 11 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief he argues that,
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"The 'no action' clause of the insurance policy contradicts any
notice of claim requirements."

It does not follow that just

because the insurance company could not be sued directly until a
judgment was obtained against its insured, that somehow excuses the
insured

from having never given notice of the claim

to its

insurance company during all those years when plaintiff's claim
against the insured was being litigated in the trial court.
On page 12 of plaintiff/appellant's Brief, it argues
that, "The appellant should not be penalized for Utah Title's
failure to give notice as required under the insurance policy at
issue.

In fact, Utah Title had specifically represented to the

appellant that it had no insurance coverage."
If Utah Title did so represent, they would have made that
representation

in good

faith

(and correctly) .

They

had no

insurance coverage because they had had a claims made policy, and
they would obviously have known that the plaintiff's claim against
them was not made during the policy period.

Plaintiff itself

acknowledges that Utah Title was "specifically informed" by the
insurance policy itself "that no claims made after the policy
period which concluded on February 5, 1978, were covered by the
insurance

policy."

(Plaintiff/appellant's

Brief

at

9,

last

paragraph.)

CONCLUSION
The material facts are without dispute.
that must be decided as a matter of law.
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This is a case

With summary judgment in this case having been granted on
each of two separate grounds (prejudicial failure to give notice to
defendants of the claim, and the claim not having been made until
after the "claims made" policy expired), in order to reverse the
trial court's granting of summary judgment, this court would,
therefore, have to both:

(1) overrule the Busch case (discussed on

pages 26-27 hereof) on the issue of lack of notice, and (2) go
against the virtually unanimous weight of authority by invalidating
"claims made" insurance policies and thereby create a risk of
serious

disruption

to the business

of

providing

malpractice

insurance to professionals.
There is not only no genuine issue as to any material
fact in this case, but there also appears to be no issue as to the
controlling legal principles.

The summary judgment granted to

defendants should be affirmed.

3rJ

day of November, 1992.
CHRISTENSEIK JENSEN &_ POWELL, P.C.

W< - ^ >-'

Richard L. E V T O S ^
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
—

day of November,

1992, ten copies of the Brief of Appellees have been mailed,
postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
and that four copies of the Brief of Appellees have been mailed,
postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Robert A. Echard
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

hMZi*
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ADDENDUM

Richard L. Evans, Jr., #1016
Jay E. Jensen, #1676
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AOK LANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
:

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

:

SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY, and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:

EP

* 1 JSSf
Civil No. 890903067CV
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

The motion for summary judgment of defendants Shand,
Morahan & Company

("Shand Morahan") and Mutual Fire, Marine &

Inland Insurance Co. ("Mutual Fire") came on regularly for hearing
before the court on August 19, 1991. Richard L. Evans of the firm
of Christensen, Jensen & Powell appeared at the hearing as attorney
for the defendants, and Robert A. Echard of the firm of Gridley,
Echard & Ward appeared as attorney for the plaintiff.

The court,

having considered the motion and the memoranda and affidavit filed
in support thereof, having considered the memorandum and affidavits
filed in opposition to the motion, having considered the pleadings
and record in this case and the arguments of counsel, being fully
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advised and having heretofore directed this order,
The court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that said defendants are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on both of the grounds set forth in defendants'
motion:

(1) that plaintiff's claim against Utah Title, the former

insured, was not made until after the "claims made" insurance
policies issued by or on behalf of defendants had expired and that
said claim was therefore not covered under the policies, and (2)
that defendants were prejudiced by not having been provided with
timely notice of plaintiff's claim against Utah Title as required
by the policies and that said claim was, for that reason also, not
covered by the policies.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendants'
motion for summary judgment against plaintiff be, and the same
hereby is, granted, and all claims of plaintiff asserted against
defendants Shand Morahan and Mutual Fire as set forth in the
complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
^i^/}^

i/i

DATED this

IT

day of August, 1991.
/

BY THE COURT:

r
;

/

/'

Stanton M. Taylor
District Court Judge

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the CI I

day of August, 1991,

a copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Robert A. Echard
Gridley, Echard & Ward
635 - 25th ^Stceet
Ogden, Utah 84)l01
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Richard L. Evans, jr., #1016
Jay E. Jensen, #1676
CHRISTENSEN, JENS6N & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MAY z Q raft
AOK LANDS, INC.,
AFFIDAVIT OF
GEORGE M. GRULKE
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAND, MORAHAN & COMPANY, and
MUTUAL FIRE, MARINE & INLAND
INSURANCE CO.,

Civil No. 890903067CV

Defendants.
STATE OF ILLINOIS

:

COUNTY OF COOK

:

George M. Grulke, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
says:
1.

I am Claims Manager and Coordinator, Mutual Fire Claim

Unit at Shand, Morahan & Company, Inc. ("Shand Morahan") whose
address is Shand Morahan Plaza, Evanston, Illinois
2.
management

Shand

Morahan

contracts,

provides,

the

subject

management

of

to

60201.
underwriting

special

risk

and

professional liability lines of business for various insurers.
This includes underwriting and claims handling.
3.

During the period of time beginning March 4, 1971 and

continuing through December 31, 1990, Shand Morahan acted as the

077

underwriting manager for Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance
Company ("Mutual Fire") with respect to the line of special risk
business

under which

the two errors and omissions

insurance

policies involved in this case were issued to Utah Title & Abstract
Company ("Utah Title").

Those are policy No. CN 502107 covering

the period from February 5, 1976 to February 5, 1977, and policy
No. CN 502852 for the period from February 5, 1977 to February 5,
1978.

As part of Shand Morahan's duties as underwriting manager,

Shand Morahan handled, on behalf of Mutual Fire, claims made
against entities insured by Mutual Fire, and until Shand Morahan's
role as underwriting manager for Mutual Fire ended on December 31,
1990, part of my duties for Shand Morahan was to receive, review
and evaluate initial loss notices, review coverage, establish claim
files based upon loss reports received; arrange for appropriate
investigation, defense and disposition of the claims.
4.

Because of Shand Morahan's role in handling claims, a

provision was typically included in the "declarations" page of
Mutual Fire policies, subject to the terms and conditions of the
Underwriting Management Agreement between Shand Morahan and Mutual
Fire, to the effect that all claims were to be reported directly to
Shand Morahan, and giving Shand Morahan's address, and such a
provision does, in fact, appear in the declarations page of each of
the two policies involved in this case (referred to in paragraph 3
above).

However, even in those instances where insureds under

Mutual Fire policies would overlook that provision and would send
notices of claims made against them directly to Mutual Fire, the
2
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routine practice between Shand Morahan and Mutual Fire was that
Mutual Fire would forward those notices of claims to Shand Morahan
for handling.
5.

Consistent

with

the

terms

and

conditions

of

the

Underwriting Management Agreement, handling claims for Mutual Fire
was a regularly conducted business activity of Shand Morahan.

As

part of that business activity I and other persons who worked with
me and under my direction regularly and promptly kept records
relating to claims made against Mutual Fire insureds, and we relied
upon those records in performing our duties to see that claims were
properly handled. Those records included notices received by Shand
Morahan of claims made against Mutual Fire insureds, resulting
investigations, correspondence, settlements, court proceedings and
various other matters relating to said claims.
6.

I have reviewed Shand Morahan's claims records with

respect to the two errors and omissions policies issued to Utah
Title, as referred to in paragraph 3 above.

I find that the first

notice or information of any kind received by Shand Morahan with
regard to the claim made by plaintiff, AOK Lands, Inc.

("AOK

Lands") against Utah Title was a letter dated June 3, 1988 from
Robert A. Echard, attorney for AOK Lands, to Shand Morahan.

In

that letter Mr. Echard informed Shand Morahan that, on behalf of
AOK Lands, he had filed a complaint against Utah Title in 1979 and
had obtained a $400,000 judgment against Utah Title and demanded
that we pay the policy limits towards that

judgment.

That

judgment, a copy of which he enclosed with that June 3, 1988
3

letter, was dated January 15, 1988, and it recited that two jury
trials had been held.
7.

Thus, even though the claim of AOK Lands had apparently

been made against Mutual Fire's insured, Utah Title, in 1979, our
records indicate that Shand Morahan did not receive any notice of
that claim from Utah Title or from AOK Lands or from anyone else
until more than eight years later, after two trials had been held
and a $400,000 judgment had been entered.
8.

Because of the absence of any notice to Shand Morahan

until June 1988, Mutual Fire and Shand Morahan were deprived of the
opportunity to do the kinds of things that we routinely do in
handling claims or to be involved in any way in the claim of AOK
Lands.

We had no opportunity to review the claim, to examine the

documents that Utah Title was alleged to have been negligent in
handling

or

drafting,

to

interview

and

take

statements

of

witnesses, to review issues of insurance coverage of Utah Title, to
adjust and possibly settle the claim, to retain an attorney to
represent Utah Title in the lawsuit filed by AOK Lands, or to
participate in any way in the defense of that suit. As a result of
the

preceding,

it

was

impossible

for

us

to

conduct

an

investigation, engage counsel to defend the allegations of the
complaint and, as such, it was prejudicial to the interest of Shand
Morahan and Mutual Fire.

4

Dated this lb*** day of May, 1991,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of May, 1991.

>

Notary Public

,>'/

My Commission expires:
OFFICIAL
SEAL
CARL SCHULZ JR.
I NOTARY PUBLIC. STATE OF ILLINOIS
I MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
5/1/931

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby

certify that

a copy

of the

foregoing

Affidavit of George M. Grulke in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment has been mailed, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following this

nth

day of May, 1991:
Robert A. Echard
Gridley, Echard & Ward
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah
84401
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